Brief.

Tag

governance

40 entries, including 15 patterns.

  1. Pattern

    Prompt-Independent Action Authorization

    Treat a leaked prompt as reconnaissance, then prove the target service still rejects out-of-scope actions regardless of the words the model uses.

  2. Pattern

    Source-Bound CI Attestation

    Treat a passing PR check as an attestation from a designated runner about an exact revision, not as a green string any repository writer can supply.

  3. The green check came from the wrong writer

    A coding agent's PR can carry a passing status for a test it never ran when the merge gate trusts the check name but not its issuer.

  4. Pattern

    Quarantine Unreviewed Installs

    Let PR validation execute lifecycle hooks only in a worker whose credentials, network and output cannot become release authority without review.

  5. The install step ran the pull request

    An agent's code-review transcript may be clean while a dependency install executes repository-controlled code before the first test.

  6. Pattern

    Effect-Bound Tool Route Gate

    Authorize the effect at the service, regardless of which agent tool pipeline requested it.

  7. The guardrail only wrapped one kind of tool

    A per-tool safety check can be correct on the route it covers and irrelevant on the route that makes the same consequential change.

  8. Pattern

    Resource-Bound Action Budget

    Keep conversation policy for sequencing, but enforce cumulative limits in an atomic resource ledger across sessions and retries.

  9. The budget reset with the conversation

    Session-aware tool policy can remember a transfer, but a fresh conversation can forget it. Put durable limits at the resource that moves the money.

  10. The hook went quiet; traffic did not

    An inline AI policy can be configured and healthy-looking while requests pass uninspected. Measure enforcement coverage, not just denials.

  11. Pattern

    Verdict Coverage Accounting

    Join independent request counts to hook verdicts and configuration state so silent inspection gaps are observable and high-impact actions stay gated.

  12. Pattern

    Pre-Dispatch Side-Effect Gate

    Separate blocking run admission from a mandatory target-facing decision so a late tripwire cannot masquerade as prevention.

  13. The guardrail finished after the send

    A parallel input check can reject a run after its tool has already sent data. Put the security decision ahead of dispatch, not beside it.

  14. The trace sampler erased the denial

    A security decision cannot be audited from a trace that was never exported. Keep a narrow action ledger outside the sampled observability path.

  15. Pattern

    Unsampled Action Receipt

    Preserve gate decisions and target outcomes even when agent traces are sampled out or filtered.

  16. Pattern

    Purpose-Bound Handoff Packets

    Give each specialist only the authenticated fields its task requires, and test the input it actually receives.

  17. The specialist inherited the whole case

    A handoff can transfer far more than the task. Decide what the receiving agent may see before it receives history.

  18. Pattern

    Adjudicated Feedback Promotion

    Keep production complaints useful for finding failures without letting them decide what a secure agent should do.

  19. Pattern

    Revocation-Aware Policy Gates

    Make policy freshness an explicit precondition for privileged agent actions, and prove revocations take effect at every serving gate.

  20. The revocation that never reached the gate

    A centrally approved policy change does not revoke an agent's access until every consequential gate stops using the old revision.

  21. When feedback becomes the test

    A complaint can reveal a failure; it should not be able to rewrite the acceptance test that decides whether an agent is safe to release.

  22. A registry spawn is not a catalog read

    Accepting an MCP client registration that carries a command is process start, not browsing a tool list.

  23. Non-empty is not authenticated

    A non-empty Authorization header is not proof that a verifier ran or that the credential is valid.

  24. Rejected is not blocked

    A finishReason of tool_rejected does not prove the tool never ran.

  25. A valid token is not your audience

    A signature and expiry check does not prove the token was issued for this MCP server.

  26. A session ID is not a credential

    Conversation continuity tracks state. It does not prove who is calling.

  27. Syntax is not intent

    A well-formed tool call can still be the wrong action. Clear syntax is not a policy verdict.

  28. Approved metadata is not a frozen contract

    A tools/list snapshot from install time is not a lasting grant. After ordinary use, the same server can rewrite what the agent trusts.

  29. Unset is not deny

    When the webhook secret is absent, an if-secret check never runs. A warning is not a closed gate.

  30. Memory without provenance is delayed authority

    A write that can steer later tool calls is a control-plane event. Without provenance and audit, you cannot govern what fires next.

  31. There is no single AI kill switch

    Incident response needs independent controls over authority, connectivity and execution.

  32. Pattern

    Three-Pillar Agent Containment

    Pre-engineer independent response controls over an agent's authority, connectivity and execution.

  33. Pattern

    External Agent Policy Enforcement

    Keep authoritative policy outside the agent's control and require its decision at every consequential service boundary.

  34. The agent edited its own policy

    A repository policy file can guide an AI coding agent. It cannot constrain the agent when the same identity can rewrite or bypass it.

  35. Cancelled is not contained

    An A2A cancellation request does not prove that delegated work has stopped or that its credentials can no longer act.

  36. Pattern

    Revocable Delegation Boundary

    Bound cross-agent authority and verify that revocation reaches delegated execution.

  37. A2A without a receipt

    An authenticated agent call still needs a record of the policy that allowed it.

  38. Pattern

    Skill Grant on the Hop

    Enforce skill-level policy at the receiving agent, then bind a durable authorization receipt to the call before it runs.

  39. A hook is not a security boundary

    If the host is trusted, a contract can prove that an action stopped. It cannot contain a host that never asks.

  40. Deny has to mean deny

    Framework callbacks observe. A governance contract has to stop the action, even if the guard crashes.